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Abstract
Inspired by problems in Private Information Retrieval, we consider
the setting where two users need to establish a communication protocol
to transmit a secret without revealing it to external observers. This
is a question of how large a linear code can be, when it is required
to agree with a prescribed code on a collection of coordinate sets. We
show how the efficiency of such a protocol is determined by the derived
matroid of the underlying linear communication code. Furthermore, we
provide several sufficient combinatorial conditions for when no secret
transmission is possible.
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1 Introduction
The constuctions in this paper were originally motivated by problems in Pri-
vate Information Retreival (PIR) [20]. Rather than describing the specific
setting that motivated our problem, we will give a generalized communica-
tion setup.
Consider a pair (Q,Q′) of linear codes of length n over a field F such
that Q ⊆ Q′ ⊆ Fn. Two parties, Alice and Bob, have agreed to use the pair
(Q,Q′) for communication. Their communication happens in two different
states with high-entropy and low-entropy messages, respectively. The reason
for doing so might, for example, be that the channel quality varies over time,
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or (as in the case of PIR) that different information is requested to avoid
surveillance. For simplicity, we may assume that one message between Alice
and Bob corresponds to one codeword x ∈ Fn, and that each symbol of x
is sent over a different link. Depending on the application, these links may
be servers, routers, or even wires. Without loss of generality, we label these
links by the integers 1, . . . , n. In the high-entropy communication state, the
message is a codeword drawn from Q′, and in the low-entropy state it is
drawn from Q.
A collection I of observers each control a different subset Tα ⊆ [n],
α ∈ I of the links. These subsets need not be disjoint. Depending on the
application, these observers can also be spies or computational clusters. The
pair (Q,Q′) should now be designed so that none of the observers can tell
whether a message is sent in the high-entropy or low-entropy communication
state. In other words, we insist that the projections Q|Tα and Q
′|Tα are the
same for every α ∈ I.
Definition 1.1. We call the collection T = {Tα : α ∈ I} a collusion pattern
and its elements T are colluding sets.
Notice that, if Q|T = Q
′|T , then it immediately follows that Q|T ′ = Q
′|T ′
for all T ′ ⊆ T , as Q|T ′ is a projection of Q|T . We can thus assume without
loss of generality that collusion patterns are closed under inclusion:
T ∈ T =⇒ T ′ ∈ T ∀T ′ ⊂ T.
In other words, T is an abstract simplicial complex and we write T =
〈T1, T2, · · · , Tr〉, where Tα are the maximal colluding sets and |I| = r. Notice
that we assume that the observers do not share information between them,
so the collusion pattern is not necessarily closed under unions. The union-
closed case is just the case where the collusion pattern is a disjoint union of
maximal colluding sets.
Definition 1.2. Let T be a collusion pattern with ground set [n], and
Q ⊆ Fn a linear code over a field F. The lift of Q over the collusion pattern
T is
QT = {x ∈ Fn : ∃y ∈ Q s.t. x|T = y|T ∀T ∈ T }.
By definition, for fixed Q, the code QT is the largest code for which the
conditions Q|T = Q
′
|T holds for all T ∈ T . We can think of the choice in
which state to communicate as a secret.
We will now illustrate this construction with an example.
Example 1.3. Let Q ⊆ F52 be the code generated by
GQ =

1 0 0 1 00 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1


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and let T = {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}}. Then QT = F52. To see this, take any
codeword x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) ∈ F
5
2. The codewords y = (x1, x2, x3, x1 +
x2, x2 + x3) ∈ Q and y
′ = (x4 − x5 + x3, x5 − x3, x3, x4, x5) ∈ Q satisfy
x|{1,2,3} = y|{1,2,3} and x|{3,4,5} = y
′|{3,4,5}. Therefore, Q
T = F52.
In the context of PIR, the secret is the identity of the downloaded file
and the code Q is used to send queries to the database [6, 13]. This work is
also related to oblivious transfer [9], collision-resistant hashing [10], locally
decodable codes [12, 23] and secret sharing [3, 17]. Motivated by several of
these applications, it is natural to define the secrecy rate as
dim(QT /Q)
n
.
In the words of our general communication setting, this is the fraction of
the channel’s bandwidth that can be used to send high-entropy information
that will not interfere with the low-entropy signal.
Our scheme relies on the ability of the transmitter and receiver to prevent
the detection of secret transmission. In this respect, it is related to the
field of information hiding, which originated in antiquity and has received
renewed attention since the 1990s due to the need to protect the copyright
on digital content [16]. Some of the known strategies for information hiding
include quantize-and-replace [1, 21], low-bit modulation [19], additive spread
spectrum [8] and quantization index modulation [5]. For a general reference,
we refer the reader to [7].
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between the combinatorics of
the communication code Q and the collusion pattern T . In particular, we
are interested in conditions under which Q = QT , so that no information
hiding is possible.
It has been shown that if the entire ground set is an element of the
collusion pattern, then Alice and Bob cannot share secret information [6].
In the current setting, this is just the trivial observation that Q〈[n]〉 = Q for
any codeQ ⊆ Fn. On the other hand, if the collusion pattern is disconnected,
i.e.,
T ⊆ T1 ⊕ T2,
where T1 and T2 are disjoint collusion patterns then it is always possible to
choose Q such that Q ( QT [20].
One collusion pattern of special importance is the t-collusion [2]. It
allows to model the situation when only the maximal size of colluding sets
is known but the pattern itself is unknown.
Definition 1.4. A t-collusion pattern is the collusion pattern given by
T = 〈T : |T | = t〉.
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As we will explain in Section 3, if T is a t-collusion, then Q = QT
whenever dimQ < t.
The starting point of this paper is the following example [18, Section
7.5].
Example 1.5. Let Q is an [n, t− 1] MDS code. Let
T = 〈{i, i + 1, . . . , i+ t− 1} : i ∈ [n]}〉,
with indices taken modulo n. Then Q = QT .
The authors of [18] use the symmetry of this collusion pattern to derive
this result. However, this pattern is redundant and, in Theorem 5.9, we will
show that it is sufficient to have any n− t+ 1 generators constructed as in
Example 1.5.
The setting in Example 1.5 is not unique and our goal was to understand
which combinatorial properties of the code Q determine when a collusion
pattern T is equivalent to t-collusion. In Theorem 4.8 we show that QT
is determined by the derived matroid of Q. The derived matroid, as con-
structed in [11, 15], is a matroid whose ground set is the set of circuits of the
matroid of Q. We show that all codes with the same matroid and derived
matroid will have combinatorially equivalent lifts. This connection to the
derived matroid allows us to determine several other t-collusion equivalent
patterns, which we present in Section 5.
2 Combinatorial preliminaries
In this section, we will review the basics of matroid theory, with a special
focus on applications in coding theory. For general references on matroid
theory we refer the reader to [14, 15].
Definition 2.1. A matroid M is a pair (C, E), where E is the ground set
and C ⊆ 2E is a collection of finite subsets of E, called circuits, that satisfies
the following axioms:
1. ∅ /∈ C
2. If C ′, C ′′ ∈ C and C ′ ⊆ C ′′, then C ′ = C ′′
3. If C ′, C ′′ ∈ C, C ′ 6= C ′′ and e ∈ C ′ ∩ C ′′, then there exists a circuit
C ∈ C such that C ⊆ (C ′ ∪ C ′′)− e.
The direct sum, or disjoint union of two matroids M = (C, E) and M ′ =
(C′, E′) is the matroid
M ⊕M ′ = (C ⊔ C′, E ⊔ E′).
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It is straightforward to verify that this is indeed a matroid. In this work,
E is a finite set, which we identify without loss of generality with [n] :=
{1, 2, . . . , n}. A set is dependent if it contains a circuit and independent
otherwise. Thus circuits are the minimal dependent sets. A matroid that
can not be written as the disjoint union of two nonempty matroids is called
connected.
A maximal independent set is called a basis. Given a basis B of a matroid
and an element e in [n]−B, there exists a unique circuit contained in B∪{e},
known as the fundamental circuit of e with respect to B.
An element e of the ground set is called a loop if it is a circuit, and a
coloop if it is contained in every basis.
For any X ⊆ [n] we can define the rank r(X) as the size of the largest
independent set contained in X. In particular, the rank r = r([n]) of the
matroid of an F-linear code Q is equal to the dimension of the code.
If X is a subset of [n], then the closure cl(X) is the set {e ∈ [n] :
r(X ∪ {e}) = r(X)}. If cl(X) = X, then X is a flat. Flats of rank r− 1 are
called hyperplanes.
The dual matroid M∗ is the matroid on the same ground set [n] whose
circuits are the sets whose complements are hyperplanes in M . The dual
rank of a set is given by r∗(X) = r([n]−X) + |X| − r(X).
The deletion of M by X ⊆ [n] is the matroid M\X = ([n] −X, C\X),
where C\X := {C ∈ C : C ⊆ [n]−X}. In coding theory, deletion corresponds
to puncturing of a linear code by columns in X. The contraction ofM by X
is the matroid C/X := {S ∈ 2[n] : ∃S′ ⊆ X s.t. S ∪ S′ ∈ C}. It corresponds
to shortening of a linear code by columns in X.
A minor of a matroid M is the matroid that is obtained from M by a
sequence of deletions and contractions. Such sequences are associative and
the operations of contraction and deletion commute. This implies that every
minor can be written M\Y/X for X,Y ⊆ E and X ∩ Y = ∅.
In this paper we work with F-representable matroids over finite ground
sets [n]. This means matroids M for which there exist a matrix G over F
with n columns, such that a set C ⊆ [n] is a circuit in M if the columns
indexed by C form a minimal F-linearly dependent set in G. The F-linear
code Q generated by such a matrix G is called a representation of M .
LetM = (C, [n]) be an F-representable matroid andQ a representation of
M . For every circuit C ofM , there exists a vector in the dual code Q⊥ ⊆ Fn
that is supported on C ⊆ [n]. Such vectors are called circuit vectors and
they are unique up to non-zero scalar multiplication. Associated to the code
Q, this set of circuit vectors represent a representation of the derived matroid
δM(Q), which is an F-representable matroid on the ground set C [15]. The
circuits of δM(Q) are given by the minimal linear dependencies between the
circuit vectors in Q⊥. The derived matroid depends on the representation
of M , so the notation δM(Q) always refers to the specific representation Q.
It is proven in [15] that a matroid M is connected if and only if all of its
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derived matroids are.
3 Construction of the lift
It will often be useful to consider equivalent definitions of the lift, which we
will present below.
Notation 3.1. Let d(x, y) be the Hamming distance of two strings x and y
of equal length, let Q be a linear code, and let T be a subset of the coordinate
set of Q. We write:
• d|T (x, y) to denote the Hamming distance of x and y restricted to a
subset T of coordinates, i.e.,
d|T (x, y) = |{i ∈ T |xi 6= yi}|;
• d(x,Q) := min
y∈Q
d(x, y) and d|T (x,Q) := min
y∈Q
d|T (x, y).
Lemma 3.2. Let Q ⊆ Fn be a linear code with dual code Q⊥. Let x ∈ Fn
and let T ⊆ [n]. Then d|T (x,Q) = 0 holds if and only if x · v = 0 for all
v ∈ Q⊥ with supp(v) ⊆ T .
Proof. We denote
Q⊥(T ) := {v ∈ Q⊥ : supp v ⊆ T},
and note that this is a linear subspace of Q⊥. First, assume that there
exists v ∈ Q⊥(T ), such that x · v 6= 0, and x′ ∈ Q with d|T (x
′, x) = 0. Then
x′ · v = x · v 6= 0, which is a contradiction, and thus d|T (x,Q) 6= 0.
Conversely, assume that x · v = 0 for all v ∈ Q⊥(T ). We will prove by
induction on n − |T | that there exists y ∈ Q such that y|T = x|T . This is
immediate (with y = x) if T = [n]. Now if T 6= [n], choose t /∈ T , and let
T ′ = T ∪ {t}. As an induction hypothesis, assume that if x′ · v = 0 for all
v ∈ Q⊥(T ′), then there exists y ∈ Q such that y|T ′ = x|T ′ . Now clearly
Q⊥(T ) ⊆ Q⊥(T ′) and dimQ⊥(T ′) ≤ Q⊥(T ) + 1, so there is a codeword
w ∈ Q⊥(T ′) such that Q⊥(T ′) = Q⊥(T ) ⊕ {c}. Now let x′ agree with x
outside of t, and get a value on t such that x′ ·w = 0. Then x′ · v = 0 for all
v ∈ Q⊥(T ′), and so by induction there is y ∈ Q with yT ′ = x
′
T ′ , wherefore
yT = x
′
T = xT .
Proposition 3.3. Definition 1.2 of the lift can be rewritten as
1. QT = {x ∈ Fn : d|T (x,Q) = 0 ∀T ∈ T }
2. QT = {x ∈ Fn : x · v = 0 for all v ∈ Q⊥(T ) and T ∈ T }.
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Proof. The first equality is just Definition 1.2 restated using Notation 3.1.
The second one follows from Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.4. Let S and T be two collusion patterns on ground set [n], and
let Q ∈ Fn be a linear code. Then
1. QS∪T = QS ∩QT .
2. QS∩T = (QS)T .
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 we have that QS∪T consists of those x ∈ Fn that are
orthogonal to all v ∈ Q⊥ with supp(v) ∈ S ∪ T , which is equivalent to that
x is orthogonal both to those v ∈ Q⊥ that have supp(v) ∈ S and those that
have supp(v) ∈ T , so x ∈ QS ∩QT .
Using Lemma 3.2 twice, we have that
(QS)T = {x ∈ Fn : x · v = 0 for all v ∈ (QS)⊥ with supp v ∈ T }
= {x ∈ Fn : x · v = 0 for all v ∈ Q⊥ with supp v ∈ S ∩ T }
= QS∩T
Corollary 3.5. Let T and T ′ be two collusion patterns such that T ⊆ T ′,
then for any linear code Q, QT ⊇ QT
′
.
The following lemma, which will be used many times in the paper, shows
that we can restrict attention to dual vectors that are supported on the
collusion pattern over which we are lifting.
Lemma 3.6. Let Q be a code with matroid M(C, [n]), and let T be a collu-
sion pattern on ground set [n]. Then
QT = QT ∩C .
Proof. The linear conditions are generated by the circuit vectors, so
Q = {x ∈ Fn : x · v = 0 for all v ∈ Q⊥ with supp(v) ∈ C}
=
⋂
C∈C
{x ∈ Fn : x · v = 0 for v ∈ Q⊥ with supp(v) = C}
=
⋂
C∈C
{x ∈ Fn : xC ∈ QC} = Q
C .
By Lemma 3.4, we thus have QT ∩C = (QC)T = QT .
Corollary 3.7. Let Q be a code with matroid M(C, [n]), and let T be a
collusion pattern on ground set [n]. Then
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1. if C ⊆ T , then Q = QT ;
2. QT = Fn if and only if C ∩ T = ∅;
3. If Q is an [n, k] MDS code and for all T , |T | ≤ k, then QT = Fn.
Definition 3.8. We call the circuit vectors supported on T ∩ C observed
circuit vectors.
Let Q be a linear code over F and T a collusion pattern. We will now
show how to construct the lift QT by identifying a basis of the dual (QT )⊥.
By Lemma 3.6, we can restrict our attention to the observed circuit vectors.
Fix a generator matrix GQ for Q and take its row-reduced restriction on
T , which we denote by (GQ)|T . If (GQ)|T ≡ I|T |, then Q
T = F|T |. On the
other hand, if (GQ)|T 6≡ I|T |, then there exists a vector in Q
⊥ supported on
T . In particular, if (GQ)|T ≡ (I|T |−1|v), where v is a column with non-zero
entries, then T corresponds to the support of a circuit vector, and the exact
coordinates of this circuit vector are given by v.
We are now ready to describe an algorithm for constructing QT .
Proposition 3.9. Let Q be a code over F and T a collusion pattern. The
lift QT can be constructed using the following algorithm:
1. Identify the set V of observed circuit vectors using restrictions of GQ
on each colluding set;
2. Form a matrix H whose rows are the circuit vectors in V;
3. Row reduce and bring H to the systematic form without changing the
labels of the columns (although their order might change).
4. Produce the parity check matrix G of H and permute its columns, so
that their order corresponds to the index in Step 3. The matrix G is a
generator matrix of QT .
Proof. The matrix G is constructed to be a generator matrix of some vector
space V , so it is unique up to elementary row operations. By construction,
V is generated by the circuit vectors in C ∩ T , so, by Lemma 3.6, we have
V = QT .
We will now illustrate the algorithm with an example.
Example 3.10. Let Q be the Reed-Solomon RS7[7, 3] code whose canonical
generator matrix is
GQ =

1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 1 4 2 2 4 1

 .
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Let the maximal elements of T be {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5, 6}, {4, 5, 6, 7}}.
Then the collection of observed circuit vectors is
V = {x1 + 4x2 + 3x3 = x4, x2 + 5x3 + 2x5 = x6, x4 + 4x5 + 3x6 = x7},
which corresponds to matrix
H =
i ii iii iv v vi vii[ ]1 4 3 6 0 0 0
0 1 5 0 2 6 0
0 0 0 1 4 3 6
≡
i ii iv iii v vi vii[ ]1 0 0 4 3 0 6
0 1 0 5 2 6 0
0 0 1 0 4 3 6
.
This gives a generator matrix for QT :
G =
i ii iv iii v vi vii



3 2 0 1 0 0 0
4 5 3 0 1 0 0
0 1 4 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1
≡
i ii iii iv v vi vii



3 2 1 0 0 0 0
4 5 0 3 1 0 0
0 1 0 4 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1
.
4 Invariance with respect to derived matroid
Let Q be a linear code of length n and dimension t − 1 over F and T a
collusion patterns. Lemma 3.4 and 3.6 say that we can assume that
1. T is connected, i.e. for every maximal colluding set Ti in T , there is
another maximal Tj in T such that Ti ∩ Tj 6= ∅;
2. every maximal colluding set T in T has cardinality at most t;
3. for every i ∈ [n], there exists a colluding set T such that {i} ( T .
We want to identify a combinatorial invariant of Q that determines the
matroid of QT . Proposition 4.1 shows that one indeed needs to take into
account the properties of Q.
Proposition 4.1. Let T and T ′ be two different collusion patterns. Then
there exists a code Q such that
QT 6= QT
′
.
Proof. Take T ∈ T −T ′. Choose Q ( Fnq so that T is the only circuit in the
matroid M(Q). Then, by Corollary 3.7, QT
′
= Fnq but Q
T = Q.
Corollary 4.2. Let T = {T ⊆ E : |T | ≤ t}. There does not exist a collusion
pattern T ′ ( T such that
QT
′
= QT ∀Q.
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Furthermore, it is not enough to consider the matroid of Q as we illus-
trate in Example 4.3.
Example 4.3. Let Q1 and Q2 be two [6, 3] MDS codes over F7 as follows.
A generator matrix for the dual code Q⊥1 is
GQ⊥
1
=

1 2 1 5 0 01 5 0 0 5 1
0 0 5 1 2 1


and a generator matrix for the dual code Q⊥2 is
GQ⊥
2
=

1 1 1 1 0 00 0 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6

 .
Hence, M(Q1) =M(Q2). Assume the collusion pattern is
T = {1234, 1256, 3456}.
In Q1, the unique dual codewords supported on the facets of T are
{(1, 2, 1, 5, 0, 0), (1, 5, 0, 0, 5, 1), (0, 0, 5, 1, 2, 1)}
and they form a basis of Q⊥1 , so Q1 = Q
T
1 . Observe that uniqueness follows
from the fact that the facets of T are circuits in M(Q1).
On the other hand, in Q2, the corresponding codewords are
{(1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0, 6, 6)},
where
(1, 1, 0, 0, 6, 6) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) − (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1),
so Q1 ( Q
T
1 and uniqueness again follows from the fact that the facets are
circuits in M(Q2).
At the same time, Example 4.3 suggests that the matroid of the lift QT
is determined by the derived matroid of Q. We will make this precise in
Theorem 4.8.
Definition 4.4. Let Q1 and Q2 be two different linear codes such that
M(Q1) = M(Q2). A collusion pattern T separates Q1 and Q2 if M(Q
T
1 ) 6=
M(QT2 ).
Lemma 4.5 (Separating collusion patterns). Let Q1 and Q2 be two different
linear codes such that M(Q1) =M(Q2) but δM(Q1) 6= δM(Q2). Then there
exists a non-empty set of separating collusion patterns
{T :M(QT1 ) 6=M(Q
T
2 )}.
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Proof. Since the two codes have different derived matroids, there exists a
set S of circuits that is independent in δM(Q1) but dependent in δM(Q2).
Choosing T = S gives a separating collusion pattern.
Question 4.6. Let Q1 and Q2 be two different linear codes such that
M(Q1) = M(Q2) but δM(Q1) 6= δM(Q2). Is there a combinatorial charac-
terisation of the set of separating collusion patterns
{T :M(QT1 ) 6=M(Q
T
2 )}?
The following lemma shows that the matroid of the lift is a flat in the
derived matroid.
Lemma 4.7. Let Q be a code over F and T a collusion pattern. Then the
matroid of the lift is
M(QT ) = F(S),
where S ⊆ C ∩ T is the maximal subset of colluding sets that is independent
in the derived matroid δM(Q) and F(S) is the flat of S in δM(Q).
Proof. Recall from Proposition 3.9 that QT is generated by the circuit vec-
tors corresponding to the colluding circuits C ∩ T . Therefore, every circuit
vector of M(QT ) is an element of F(C ∩ T ). But
C ∩ T ⊆ F(S),
so M(QT ) ⊆ F(S).
On the other hand, if C ∈ F(S), then any codeword in QT supported
on C should satisfy the linear equation given by its circuit vector. Hence,
C ∈M(QT ).
We are now ready to show that the operation of taking a lift is invariant
with respect to the equivalence class of derived matroids.
Theorem 4.8. Let Q1 and Q2 be two different linear codes with M(Q1) =
M(Q2). Then M(Q
T
1 ) = M(Q
T
2 ) for any collusion pattern T if and only if
δM(Q1) = δM(Q2).
Proof. The fact that the derived matroids need to be equal follows from
Lemma 4.5.
For the other direction, let S be the largest independent set of δM(Q1)
contained in T . Let F1(S) be the flat of S in δM(Q1). Then by Lemma 4.7,
M(QT1 ) = F1(S). By assumption, S is also the largest independent set of
δM(Q2) contained in T and F1(S) = F2(S). Therefore, M(Q
T
1 ) =M(Q
T
2 ).
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Question 4.9. The property that two codes have the same matroid and the
same derived matroid is an equivalence relation. The realization space of
an F-representable matroid M is thus partitioned according to the derived
matroids. Is it possible to characterise this partition, and is there a natural
way in which one of the parts corresponds to a “generic” derived matroid of
M?
We can think of at least two different meanings of genericity in Ques-
tion 4.9. One interpretation is that one of the parts would have higher
dimension than all the others, as varieties over F. Another interpretation
is that there would be a natural partial order of the derived matroids with
a unique maximal element. A related question with a more probabilistic
flavour is the following:
Question 4.10. Fix a F-representable matroid M and choose two repre-
sentations Q1 and Q2 uniformly at random. What is the probability that
they will have the same derived matroid?
In [11], a different but related notion of derived code was defined. For
this definition, they conjecture a positive answer to Question 4.9, with an
order-theoretic interpretation of genericity.
5 Collusion patterns equivalent to t-collusion
Recall from Corollary 3.7 that QT = Q whenever T is a t-collusion pattern
and dimQ < t. On the other hand, Example 1.5 shows that if Q is an
[n, t − 1] MDS code, it is sufficient to take the cyclical collusion pattern
given by
T = 〈{i, i + 1, . . . , i+ t− 1} : i ∈ [n]}〉
to ensure that QT = Q. In this section we will study how much t-collusion
can be reduced to maintain QT = Q for a given Q.
Definition 5.1. Let Q be a linear code over F of dimension t − 1 and T
a proper subset of t-collusion. We say that T is equivalent to t-collusion if
QT = Q.
By Lemma 4.5, a collusion pattern T is t-collusion equivalent for all F-
representations of a matroid M if and only if it contains a basis of every
derived matroid δM given by the F-representations. On the other hand,
Theorem 4.8 shows that the set of t-equivalent collusion patterns is invariant
with respect to the derived matroid of the linear code.
In this section we will state several sufficient conditions for t-equivalence.
The next lemma shows that we can assume that both the matroid of the
underlying code and the collusion pattern are connected.
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Lemma 5.2. 1. If an element e is a loop in M , then δM = U1,1 ⊕
δ(M\e). If an element e is a coloop in M , then δM = δ(M\e).
2. If T is disconnected and M is connected, then Q ( QT .
Proof. 1. This is [15, Lemma 10]. If an element e is a loop, then it
is a circuit. Then up to non-zero scalar multiplication, there exists a
unique circuit vector whose support is {e}. Hence, {e} does not belong
to any circuit in δM , so it is a coloop. Therefore, δM = U1,1⊕δ(M\e).
If an element e is a co-loop, then it is not contained in any circuit.
Hence, for every representation of M ,
δM = δM(C, [n]) = δM(C, [n] − {e}) = δ(M\e).
2. Let Q be an F-representation of M . Since M does not have any
coloops, C 6⊆ Ti for all i. On the other hand, if C∩Ti is empty for some
i, then Q ( QT , so T is not t-collusion equivalent. Assume C ∩ Ti is
non-empty for all i. Then
QT = QT1 ⊕QT2 ) Q.
Remark 5.3. Since the circuit vectors of an [n, t − 1, d] code Q generate
the dual code Q⊥, the inclusion maximal independent sets of circuits have
cardinality n− t+1. This is the same as saying that the rank of the derived
matroid is n− t+ 1.
Lemma 5.4. Let M be an F-representable matroid on the ground set [n].
Take any set of circuits S = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} such that every circuit Ci
satisfies
Ci −
⋃
Cj∈S−{Ci}
Cj 6= ∅.
Then S is independent in the derived matroid of every F-representation of
M .
Proof. Consider the set V of the circuit vectors corresponding to the ele-
ments of S. Take any vi ∈ V. Since
Ci −
⋃
Cj∈S−{Ci}
Cj =: ∆ 6= ∅,
the vector vi will be the only vector in V to have non-zero coordinates on
∆. Hence, vi cannot be a linear combination of V − {vi}.
The following is a useful specialization of [15, Lemma 3].
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Proposition 5.5. Let M be an F-representable matroid of rank t−1. Let T
contain all fundamental circuits of some basis of M . Then T is t-collusion
equivalent for all F-representations M .
Proof. Recall that a fundamental circuit C(e,B) of e ∈ [n]−B is the unique
circuit contained in B ∪ e. This means that T contains a set satisfying
Lemma 5.4. Furthermore, the existence of this set is independent of the
representation of M . This set has cardinality n − |B| = n − t + 1. By
Remark 5.3, this is a basis in every derived matroid δM and hence T is
t-collusion equivalent.
Corollary 5.6. Let S ⊆ [n] be a set of cardinality t−1. A collusion pattern
given by
〈{ei ∪ S : ei ∈ [n]− S}〉
is t-collusion equivalent for every [n, t− 1] MDS code.
The standard construction of a parity check matrix of a code that in-
volves the transposition of the parity check elements is an example of the
bases described in Proposition 5.5. Theorem 5.9 describes when a t-collusion
equivalent pattern corresponds to the support of a triangular matrix. We
provide examples of such collusion patterns on the ground set of 6 element
in Figure 1.
Definition 5.7. An ordered family C1, C2, · · · , Ck of sets is triangular if
there exist elements e1, e2, · · · , ek such that ei ∈ Ci and
{e1, e2, · · · , ei−1} ∩ Ci = ∅ ∀i > 1.
Definition 5.8. Let C1, . . . , Ck and D be sets such that D ⊆ ∪
k
i=1Ci. An el-
ement e ∈ ∪ki=1Ci is called hanging with respect to the pair (D, {C1, . . . , Ck})
if e /∈ D and e is contained in exactly one Ci. A collusion pattern T is called
hanging if for every collection of generators C1, . . . , Ck,D with D ⊆ ∪
k
i=1Ci,
there is a hanging element with respect to the pair (D, {C1, . . . , Ck}).
Theorem 5.9 (Patterns defining a triangular matrix). Let M be an F-
representable matroid of rank t− 1. Let T be a collusion pattern generated
by n − t + 1 circuits of M . Then the following characterisations of the
generating set are equivalent and such T is t-collusion equivalent in every
F-representation of M .
1. There is an ordering C1, C2, · · · , Cn−t+1 of the generators of T that is
triangular.
2. The collusion pattern T is hanging.
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C1
C2
C3
(a) ”Triangular” collusion pattern
C1
C2
C3
(b) ”Hanging” collusion pattern
Figure 1: Examples of t-collusion equivalent patterns on 6 elements.
Proof. • 1 =⇒ t-equivalent : If C1, C2, · · · , Cn−t+1 is a triangular se-
quence of generators of T , then the corresponding circuit vectors form
a triangular matrix of rank n − t − 1, and so they generate the dual
matroid of M . Thus, every linear condition on any representation of
M is observed by T , so T is t-collusion equivalent.
• 1 =⇒ 2 : If, for a circuit Ci, there exists a collection
{Ci1 , Ci2 , · · · , Cim}
such that
Ci ⊆
m⋃
j=1
Cij ,
then ij < i for all j. Then Cmin ij contains an element emin ij that is
not in Ci or any other Cij .
• 2 =⇒ 1 : We denote the set of generators of T by S, and want to
show that there is a triangular ordering of S. By the hanging property,
for any subcollection S ′ ⊆ S, there is at least one set in S ′ that is not
covered by the others. Letting S0 = S, we can thus inductively select
Ci+1 ∈ Si as a set that is not covered by the other sets in Si, and let
Si+1 = Si − {Ci+1}. By construction, for every i = 1...n − t+ 1 there
is an element ei+1 ∈ Ci+1 that is not contained in any of the sets in
Si+1, so
{e1, e2, · · · , ei−1} ∩ Ci = ∅ ∀i > 1.
Thus, this is a triangular ordering of the generators in T .
Even though the two conditions in Theorem 5.9 are equivalent, the sec-
ond one is more useful in practice because it gives a direct way to test an
arbitrary collusion pattern in at most n−t+1 steps as opposed to considering
n! possible permutations of the ground set.
Moreover, Theorem 5.9 shows that in Example 1.5 it is sufficient to
consider only n− t+ 1 of the n cyclically ordered circuits.
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Question 5.10. Is there an F-representable matroid M of rank t− 1 with
a set of circuits S = {C1, C2, · · · , Cn−t+1} that does not satisfy the char-
acterisation from Theorem 5.9 but is a basis in every derived matroid of
M?
Question 5.11. What is the minimum number N of colluding circuits that
guarantee that Q = QT ? In general,
N = 1 +max{|H| : H− hyperplane in δM(Q)}.
On the other hand, it has been shown that the generalized Hamming weight
can be used to characterize the minimum size of a message that guarantees
that the eavesdropper is able to recover the secret [22, Appendix] and [4,
Section 3]. Is it possible to characterize the derived matroid of a code using
its generalized Hamming distance?
We will close by considering one more situation. Assume that one ele-
ment e of the ground set is compromised, that is, all circuits containing e
are observed.
Theorem 5.12. Let M be a connected F-representable matroid of rank t−1
on [n]. Fix some e ∈ [n]. Let the collusion pattern T be given by
T = 〈C : e ∈ C〉.
Then T is t-collusion equivalent for all representations of M .
Proof. Denote the set of generators by S and let Q be an arbitrary repre-
sentation of M over F. We claim that M(QT ) is connected. On the one
hand, since every circuit in M(QT ) is also a circuit in M , and M is con-
nected, the matroid M(QT ) does not contain any loops. On the other hand,
assume there exists an element f ∈ [n] that is a coloop in M(QT ). Since
M is connected, there is a circuit Ce,f containing e and f . By construction,
Ce,f ∈ S, so Ce,f is a circuit in M(Q
T ) containing f .
Since M(QT ) is connected and contains S, then we can apply [14, The-
orem 4.3.2] to see that all circuits of M(QT ) not containing e are given by
(C1 ∪C2)−
⋂
{C : C ∈ S, C ⊆ C1 ∪ C2}, (1)
where C1 and C2 are two distinct members of S. However, M is also con-
nected and contains S, so its remaining circuits C −S are also given by (1).
Therefore, M(QT ) =M and, thus, Q = QT .
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